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Can Computers Form Cartels? About the Need for European Institutions to 
Revise the Concertation Doctrine in the Information Age 
 
ANDREAS HEINEMANN* 
ALEKSANDRA GEBICKA** 
 
KEY POINTS 
Traditionally, the European Commission and the European courts have considered that a concertation 
arises as soon as information is exchanged among competitors. 
That approach creates difficulties on information based markets where computers and more generally 
machines systematically organise such exchanges and may thus give rise to allegations of cartel 
infringement for their operators, despite the absence of any fraudulous intention whatsoever on the 
part of the latter 
In our opinion, such development emphasizes the need, for the European institutions, to revisit their 
doctrine, and their jurisprudence, on the formation of anticompetitive coordination.  
 
I. Restrictive Practices in a Computerised World 
 
Faced with the growing computerisation of commercial activities, Competition Law is required to 
develop and modernise its analytical toolkit to adapt to new situations that arise thanks to the use of 
computers and online services. So far, the discussion has focused on two aspects of this growing 
phenomenon. On the one hand, there is the general question whether traditional Competition Law is 
capable of coping with the particular features of the digital economy, and on the other hand how it 
would apply to specific manifestations of information and communication technologies (ICT), for 
instance hardware and software markets, e-commerce, search engines, social media and big data.1 
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The 2016 judgment of the European Court of Justice (ECJ)2 in the case of Eturas and others shows 
that technological advances also constitute a challenge to the vocabulary employed by Competition 
Law, in particular to the categories of ‘agreement’ and ‘concerted practices’, which are at the core of 
the cartel and collusion prohibition of Art. 101 TFEU. Outside of the field of merger control, firms 
which are not dominant can only violate European Competition Law if they conclude an agreement 
or have recourse to concerted practices with the object or effect of restriction of competition and 
affectation of cross-border trade in the EU or the EEA.3 For this reason, a clear understanding of these 
terms is fundamental. In an unwavering line of case law, the ECJ has consistently and invariably 
interpreted the term 'agreement' as the "expression of the joint intention of the parties" which also 
extends to gentlemen's agreements, i.e. to commitments which are not based on legal, but rather on 
‘moral’ considerations.4 There has to be “concurrence of wills” even if details of the agreement have 
still to be finalised.5 The participation in a collusive meeting creates a presumption of illegality which 
can be rebutted by public distancing "which must be perceived as such by the other parties to the 
cartel".6 The concept of concerted practices, on the other hand, "refers to a form of coordination 
between undertakings, which, without having been taken to the stage where an agreement properly 
so-called has been concluded, knowingly substitutes for the risks of competition, practical 
cooperation between them which leads to conditions of competition which do not correspond to the 
normal conditions of the market". 7  In practice, this type of restriction is applied where wilful 
coordination takes place while the existence of an agreement cannot be proved, or where the parties 
behave in a concerted manner without having gone as far as to reach an agreement. The distinction 
between (illegal) concerted practices and a mere parallelism of conduct, for example based on one 
undertaking’s observations of its competitors' behaviour in the market, is not always an easy one to 
draw. 
 
As undertakings continue to expand their ICT applications to a growing number of sectors, it has 
become possible to influence prices and other parameters of competition through appropriate 
programming. While Competition Law addresses ‘undertakings’, ie. legal entities like companies and 
businesses, it is notable that the traditional definitions of agreements and concerted practices, which 
                                                 
2  ECJ, 21.1.2016, C-74/14 – Eturas and others, ECLI:EU:C:2016:42 ("ECJ – Eturas"). 
3  Art. 101(1) TFEU and Art. 53(1) EEA-Agreement; most of the EU Member States (and of the Contracting Parties 
of the EEA) have taken over these terms in their national Competition Law, see e.g. Art. L420-1 of the French Commercial 
Code, Section 2 (1) of the British Competition Act 1998 and § 1 of the German Act Against Restraints of Competition 
(GWB). 
4  ECJ, 15.7.1970, 41/69 – Chemiefarma/Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1970:71, n. 112. 
5  General Court, 13.9.2013, T-566/08 – Total Raffinage Marketing/Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2013:423, n. 32. 
6  ECJ, 17.9.2015, C-634/13 P, Total Marketing Services/Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2015:614, n. 21. 
7  ECJ, 16.12.1975, Joined Cases 40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113  and 114/73 – Suiker Unie and 
others/Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174, n. 26. 
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use terms like ‘concurrence of wills’, ‘meeting of the minds’ and ‘coordination’, refer to physical 
human beings within the firms. In the digital economy, it is becoming increasingly challenging to 
transfer these subjective concepts to computerised systems which necessitate human intervention less 
and less. The Eturas case is the first opportunity for the ECJ to specify the conditions of the 
application of EU Competition Law to automated processes. 
 
 
II. Online booking platforms 
 
1. Facts 
 
The case concerned 30 travel agencies in Lithuania that were all using an online booking system 
called E-TURAS, owned by the travel agency Eturas.8 Through the E-TURAS booking system, 
Eturas imposed on the other agencies a technical restriction on the discount rates they could offer 
their own clients, and posted a notice informing its 30 users about it. The Lithuanian Competition 
Council launched an investigation after receiving word from one of the travel agencies, attracting its 
attention to the fact that all 30 of them were using E-TURAS to coordinate discounts offered to end 
consumers, which the system automatically limited to 3%. Discounts in excess of 3% were 
automatically reduced to 3% by the system. Although additional discounts to individual clients 
remained possible, the majority of agencies which granted higher discounts beforehand decreased the 
discount rate to 3% after the change. 
 
The Lithuanian Competition Council found that the 30 agencies had participated in a concerted 
practice that infringed Art. 101(1) TFEU as well as Lithuanian Competition Law on the same matter. 
The Competition Council fined all of the participants except the agency that informed it of the 
practice. The case was appealed all the way up to the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania. 
 
The agencies argued that they had not engaged in concerted practices such as prohibited by 
Art. 101(1) TFEU or national Competition Law. Their stance was that the restriction on the discounts 
was a technical unilateral act by Eturas, involving no will or intention on their part. Regarding their 
intention, some claimed not to have read the information Eturas posted about limiting the discount 
rates. Other arguments included only fractionally relying on E-TURAS in their business activities 
and the maintained possibility of loyalty discounts in excess of 3% for the agencies’ clients. A 
                                                 
8  For the purposes of clarity and in order to respect the original spelling, the name "Eturas" refers to the travel 
agency, while the term "E-TURAS" refers to the online booking system shared by all concerned agencies. 
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worrying statement revealed that the agencies used the E-TURAS booking system because it was 
convenient for online sales when there were no alternative choices on the market. 
 
On the other hand, the Lithuanian Competition Council argued that E-TURAS was a platform for the 
concerted practice to operate in, that it allowed ‘concurrence of the wills’ while avoiding direct 
contact, and that the agencies failed to effectively oppose the discount restriction. Their own 
economic activities were affected and the knowledge of the limitation eliminated uncertainty in the 
economic activity of their competitors. Normally, in the travel agencies market, it could be expected 
that competing agencies would fight for clients by offering discounts. 
 
2. The traditional position on concertation 
 
a) Starting Point 
In the judgment, the Court reiterates the rationale behind the prohibition of restrictive agreements: 
according to the long-established requirement of independence 9 , each economic operator must 
autonomously determine the policy which it intends to adopt on the internal market, without 
knowledge of how its competitors will behave. Direct or indirect contacts between undertakings are 
precluded, regardless of whether if they are supposed to influence competitors or just to inform them 
about one's own conduct, "where the object or effect of those contacts is to give rise to conditions of 
competition which do not correspond to the normal conditions of the market in question".10 The Court 
also mentions the application of Competition Law to passive behaviour: participation in anti-
competitive meetings is indicative of collusion if the firm does not publicly distance itself or does not 
report the event to the competent authority.11 
 
As regards the burden of proof, the Court points to Art. 2 Regulation No 1/2003, which allocates the 
burden of proving an infringement of Art. 101(1) TFEU on the party or the authority alleging the 
infringement, and the burden of proving a justification based on Art. 101(3) TFEU on the defendant. 
Still, a distinction has to be made in this context. EU law including Art. 2 Regulation No 1/2003 only 
gives general rules. The Regulation does not address more specific aspects, in particular the principles 
                                                 
9 See AG Szpunar, 16.7.2015, C-74/14 – Eturas and others, ECLI:EU:C:2016:42, n. 32. The requirement of 
independence (in German: "Selbständigkeitspostulat") is at least recognized since ECJ, 16.12.1975, Joined Cases 40 to 
48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113  and 114/73 – Suiker Unie and others/Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1975:174, n. 174. The English 
terminology is not uniform: In the Eturas judgment, the ECJ also uses the term of "requirement of autonomy", see ECJ – 
Eturas, n. 27. 
10  ECJ – Eturas, n. 27. 
11  ECJ – Eturas, n. 28. 
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governing the assessment of evidence and the standard of proof in national proceedings.12 Hence, 
these questions are part of the procedural autonomy of Members States. When filling in these gaps, 
however, the latter have to respect the principle of equivalence (the procedure for cases of EU law 
must be equivalent to the one involving national law) and of effectiveness (no excessive requirements 
for exercising rights conferred by EU law so as to render EU law ineffective).13 
 
With respect to concerted practices, the distribution of competences between EU and national law 
has the following consequence: on the one hand, there are basic rules which form "an integral part 
of the EU law which the national court is required to apply".14 An example of a rule on the EU level 
is the so-called Anic presumption,15 according to which a causal connection is presumed once the 
concertation and a corresponding behaviour have been shown.16 On the other hand, the rules on the 
assessment of evidence and the standard of proof are up to national law, even though it must respect 
the EU principles of equivalence and effectiveness. 
 
b) Application to an Online Booking System 
The ECJ applies this framework to the information flow in an online booking system and makes some 
important distinctions in this context. Their importance can best be understood if a clear separation 
between the three conditions of a concerted practice is made: concertation, subsequent conduct and 
the causal link between them. 
 
Concertation 
The Anic presumption refers to the causal link between concertation and subsequent conduct, not to 
the existence of concertation itself. Consequently, the Court attributes the question of concertation to 
the assessment of evidence and the standard of proof, so that national law has to give the answer.17 
Therefore, it is up to national law to decide if the dispatch of a message in an online booking system 
is sufficient to prove that the addressees were aware, or ought to have been aware, of its content.18 
However, the (EU-law based) principle of effectiveness requires that concertation may not only be 
proven by direct evidence but can also be inferred from "coincidences and indicia" if they are 
                                                 
12  ECJ – Eturas, n. 29-30; see also Recital 5 of Regulation No 1/2003. 
13  ECJ – Eturas, n. 32. See also previous case law, for instance ECJ, 10.07.1999, C-261/95 - Rosalba Palmisani v 
Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS), ECLI:EU:C:1997:351, n. 27. 
14  ECJ – Eturas, n. 33. 
15  ECJ, 8.7.1999, C-49/92 P – Commission/Anic Partecipazioni, ECLI:EU:C:1999:356, n. 121; cf. AG Szpunar – 
Eturas, n. 33. 
16  ECJ – Eturas, n. 33. 
17  ECJ – Eturas, n. 34. 
18  Ibid. 
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objective and consistent.19 Furthermore, such indirect evidence must comply with the presumption of 
innocence (Art. 48(1) EU Charter of Fundamental Rights). Therefore, it is not allowed to deduce 
awareness of one actor from the mere dispatch of the message in the booking system by another actor. 
Nevertheless, the presumption of innocence "does not preclude the referring court" from using "other 
objective and consistent indicia" for a presumption of awareness. Firms may rebut this presumption 
"for example by proving that they did not receive that message or that they did not look at the section 
in question or did not look at it until some time had passed since that dispatch”.20 This reasoning, 
while logical, does indeed rest on the firm's ability to demonstrate that they did not know something, 
which might be difficult to prove. 
 
Subsequent Conduct 
The ECJ does not explicitly deal with subsequent conduct. Typically, the behaviour following a 
concertation is raising prices or reducing output. In this context, the Court mentions the 
implementation of the software limiting discounts to 3%. It takes into consideration the possibility 
for the agencies to grant higher discounts, but underlines the fact that the system nevertheless requires 
them "to take additional technical steps in order to do so".21 No further details are given.22 Instead, 
the importance of being aware of the system notice's content is reiterated.23 In sum, the requirements 
concerning subsequent conduct seem to be less developed than those for the concertation and the 
causal link. 
 
Causal Link between Concertation and Subsequent Conduct 
As mentioned above, the relationship of cause and effect is presumed once the concertation and the 
subsequent conduct on the market have been shown.24  According to established case law,25  an 
undertaking may rebut the presumption by publicly distancing itself from it or by reporting it to the 
administrative authorities. The ECJ specifies that in the case of an online booking system where the 
addressees of a system notice do not know each other it is not necessary to send declarations to 
everybody. It is sufficient that an objection is sent to the administrator of that system.26  If the 
coordination does not take place in the form of a meeting, other circumstances allow the rebuttal of 
                                                 
19  ECJ – Eturas, n. 35-37. 
20  ECJ – Eturas, n. 38-41. 
21  ECJ – Eturas, n. 43. 
22  The granting of higher discounts only occurs again when the rebuttal of the Anic presumption is discussed, cf. 
ECJ – Eturas, n. 49. 
23  ECJ – Eturas, n. 44. 
24  See supra note 15. 
25  See supra note 6. 
26  ECJ – Eturas, n. 47-48. For the factual background see AG Szpunar – Eturas, n. 88. 
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the presumption, for instance proof that consistently higher discounts have been granted, above those 
allowed by the system.27 
 
c) Giving rise to a presumption 
Price-related measures implemented in online booking systems used by competitors may give rise to 
the presumption of an illicit concerted practice. This may occur even if the measure is implemented 
by a single user without asking for the others' input or opinion. This is even more so the case if the 
administrator of that system posts a message in the users' system mailboxes revealing an intention to 
cap discounts, if this notice is then followed by a technical restriction that implements the announced 
discount limit, and finally if the users are aware of that message. Awareness may not be deduced 
from the mere dispatch of the message in the mailbox of that system. However, awareness may be 
inferred from indirect evidence. Once awareness has been established, the existence of a concerted 
practice is presumed unless the parties rebut this presumption by publicly distancing themselves from 
the anticompetitive initiative, by reporting it to the authorities or by showing that discounts exceeding 
the cap have been practiced repeatedly and methodically. In our view proof of an intention to actively 
counter-act the restriction would also be beneficial. 
 
III. IT systems and cartel prohibition 
 
The Eturas case breaks new ground. The ECJ gives some guidance regarding the conditions under 
which the design of IT systems enters into conflict with the cartel prohibition. The case touches upon 
price-related features of online booking systems, in particular the determination of discounts. 
Interfering with the freedom of price determination may very well lead to an illegal collusion between 
the users of that system. The Court tries to apply the requirements of Art. 101(1) TFEU to 
computerised sales systems. In spite of increasing automatisation, it is the ‘awareness’ of the 
participants which is at the heart of the analysis. In the following analysis, the different elements of 
these findings shall be examined. 
 
  
                                                 
27  ECJ – Eturas, n. 46, 49. 
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1. Concertation 
 
a) Coordination in online booking systems 
At the heart of the case stands the "unusual method of communication" between the undertakings 
concerned.28 The accusation of collusion is not based on standard commercial dialogue through 
emails or meetings, but on a message sent by the E-TURAS booking system administrator to the users 
of that system and which arrived in a mailbox specifically reserved to that system.29 That inbox is 
protected by an individual online password, and the message there can be opened by the users of the 
system. Most crucially in question are the conditions in which such intra-system messages amount to 
a coordination between competing firms. At first sight, the sending of the message by the system 
administrator is unilateral conduct. Of course, the parties raised this argument,30 but the Court – 
probably due to the specific formulation of the preliminary questions – did not directly react to this 
problem. Implicitly, the Court starts from the idea that concertation exists where the users of the 
online booking system are aware of the system message. 
 
Advocate General Szpunar discusses this question in more depth and focuses on the existence of 
consensus without requiring a high degree of formalisation. One of the special circumstances of the 
case is the fact that the travel agencies did not explicitly answer the system message announcing the 
cap of discount rates. There was no unequivocal approval. However, the absence of response may 
mean acquiescence where "the circumstances are propitious to the formation of a tacit consensus".31 
In this context, it is important to note that the sender of the system message is not a competitor but 
the rightful owner of the online booking system who has concluded valid licensing agreements with 
the travel agencies allowing them the use of the system. The Advocate General suggests that in a 
situation where the sender of the message is not a competitor but a third party, horizontal collusion 
takes place if the message comes from a competitor "or at least is also communicated to a competitor" 
thus giving rise to mutual action even in absence of response.32 
 
This interpretation seems convincing. The mechanism by which competitors coordinate their pricing 
behaviour is of secondary importance. It is the very goal of the expression ‘concerted practices’ – a 
modality to cover all methods of wilful cooperation. The three forms of collusion mentioned in 
Art. 101(1) TFEU (agreements, decisions by associations, concerted practices) are comparable "and 
                                                 
28  AG Szpunar – Eturas, n. 53. 
29  The peculiarity of this form of communication is underlined by AG Szpunar – Eturas, n. 60. 
30  See ECJ – Eturas, n. 19. 
31  AG Szpunar – Eturas, n. 46-49. 
32  AG Szpunar – Eturas, n. 50-51. 
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are only distinguishable from each other by their intensity and the forms in which they manifest 
themselves".33 Therefore, the fact that a third party - who is not a competitor - plays a major role in 
the horizontal coordination is not a decisive factor. It is only important if the competing agencies 
reach a coordination among themselves through the intervention of that third party. In this context, it 
has to be underlined that the system message announcing the discount cap did not come out of the 
blue. Evidence shows that there had been prior communication between Eturas and the travel 
agencies regarding a possible reduction of discount rates.34 The agencies were participating in a 
common booking system, there was a notice informing of the discount restriction and the agencies 
remained active on their market after the restriction was automatically implemented in the E-TURAS 
system. In sum, the Court was right to reject the argument that the discount restriction was a unilateral 
act by Eturas. 
 
b) Unilateral Behaviour in a Contractual Relationship 
The case law on unilateral acts within a standing contractual relationship is ambiguous. In several 
cases, the ECJ has qualified apparently unilateral acts within a distribution system as part of the 
agreement "inasmuch as their purpose is to guarantee observance of the agreements in restraint of 
competition".35 In other cases, concurrence of wills was rejected. An example is the Bayer case in 
which the European Commission had described as restrictive agreements supply restrictions imposed 
by a pharmaceutical company in order to prevent parallel imports. The Court, however, did not share 
this view: the mere coexistence of a distribution agreement and a unilaterally imposed supply 
restriction does not, according to the Court, make the supply restriction part of an agreement in the 
sense of Competition Law.36 
 
The Bayer decision is doubtful since the interaction of stimulus and response in this case would have 
allowed at least the finding of concerted practices.37 For the purposes of our analysis, it is sufficient 
to note that no contradiction between the Eturas and the Bayer cases arises.38 The Bayer case concerns 
vertical relationships where a supplier takes (apparently) unilateral measures which complement a 
distribution agreement compatible with Competition Law. In the Eturas case, however, the system 
                                                 
33  ECJ, 8.7.1999, C-49/92 P – Commission/Anic Partecipazioni, ECLI:EU:C:1999:356, n. 131. 
34  See the indications of AG Szpunar – Eturas, n. 75-78. 
35  ECJ, 25.10.1983, 107/82 – AEG/Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1983:293, n. 39; see the summary of the case law in 
General Court, 9.7.2009, T-450/05 – Peugeot and Peugeot Nederland/Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2009:262, n. 168 et seq. 
36  ECJ, 6.1.2004, Joined Cases C-2/01 P and C-3/01 P – BAI and Commission/Bayer, ECLI:EU:C:2004:2, n. 96 et 
seq., 140 et seq. 
37  See Andreas Heinemann, Intellectual Property Rights and Market Integration, in: Anderman/Ezrachi (eds.), 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law: New Frontiers, Oxford 2011, p. 308-309. 
38  Also in this sense AG Szpunar – Eturas, n. 64 who explains the difference to a hub-and-spoke system in n. 65. 
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message is used to coordinate the discount policy of the members of that system. Technical means 
reinforce the effectiveness of that coordination. The very goal of this mechanism is coordination in a 
horizontal relationship which is facilitated by the interference of the system administrator. Following 
the T-Mobile Netherlands case,39 the Advocate General argued that also in the Eturas case one 
selective manipulation of one parameter of competition occurred which was sufficient to violate 
Art. 101(1) TFEU.40 In our view, however, the coordination in the Eturas case cannot be compared 
to a ‘single meeting’. The technical change in the computer system takes place on a lasting basis. 
Regular meetings are replaced by a permanent IT-mechanism capping discounts at 3%. Even more 
complex objects of coordination could be covered by such an instrument. The one-off alteration of 
an IT system often is much more inclusive and effective than a single meeting in the real world, and 
its restrictive scope extends substantially further in breadth and time. Thus, it does not seem necessary 
for us to point to the ‘one meeting’ situation of the T-Mobile Netherlands case in order to find 
concerted practices in the Eturas constellation. 
 
c) Awareness 
Concertation is at the heart of the Eturas case. Although not expressly stated, the message of the 
judgment seems to be that concertation is not imaginable without awareness of the system notice 
announcing the cap of the discount rate. The ECJ deals primarily with questions of proof: Awareness 
cannot be derived from the mere dispatch of the message in the booking system. On the other hand, 
direct proof is not necessary, but awareness can be shown by means of indicia, always provided that 
the accused firm has the possibility to rebut the ensuing presumption by showing for example that it 
did not open the message. 
 
These principles are well-balanced and deserve approval, but they hide an inaccuracy of the Eturas 
decision. The referring national court asks in its preliminary question if the proof of the system notice 
allows the presumption that the "economic operators were aware, or ought to have been aware, of 
the system notice introduced into the computerised information system".41 In the context of concerted 
practices, there is a significant difference between ‘was aware’ and ‘ought to have been aware’ since 
concertation requires that the risks of competition are ‘knowingly’ substituted by practical 
cooperation.42 Hence, concertation only takes place if there is a wilful activity. Parallel conduct which 
is not based on conscious coordination - but for instance on observation of the behaviour of 
                                                 
39  See ECJ, 4.6.2009, C-8/08 – T-Mobile Netherlands and others, ECLI:EU:C:2009:343, n. 60, 62. 
40  AG Szpunar – Eturas, n. 66. 
41  ECJ – Eturas, n. 25, Question 1. 
42  See supra at note 7. 
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competitors - does not violate Art. 101 TFEU even if the application of the diligence required had 
revealed the overarching cartel scheme. The Court does not distinguish between 'was aware' and 
'ought to have been aware', but mentions the two alternatives at several points in the same breath.43 
 
It is the authors’ view that this is not compatible with the fundamental goal of Art. 101 TFEU which 
aims at preventing a meeting of minds in an anti-competitive manner. Hence, it should be clarified 
that concerted practices only occur where awareness of the restriction can be proven, even if it is by 
means of (rebuttable) presumptions. For Art. 101 TFEU to be violated it is not sufficient that 
ignorance of the system notice is due to negligence. Tacit acquiescence also has to be conscious. The 
Eturas judgment is thus open to this interpretation. In the context of the presumption of innocence, 
the ECJ does not mention the phrase 'ought to have been aware' any more.44 And, more importantly, 
in the final answer to the preliminary question, the Court requires (actual) awareness in order to 
trigger the presumption of a concerted practice.45 However, this interpretation is not beyond doubt. 
Indeed, in the second part of the answer, the Court reiterates that the mere dispatch of the message in 
the computer system does not constitute sufficient evidence that the user of that system "ought to 
have been aware of its content".46 This remark creates confusion as to the precise conditions of a 
concerted practice. It should be noted that concertation requires actual and not only potential 
awareness of the measures aiming at a restriction of competition. On the other hand, actual awareness 
may be proved by indirect evidence, for example indicia, circumstantial evidence and other details of 
the case. The Court should have made this point clearer. 
 
While the method of communication in the Eturas case is less usual than standard commercial 
dialogue through emails or meetings, it does not change the fact that it was an initiative to engage in 
an illicit anti-competitive practice. There was no reaction to the negative by any agency and a 
maintained continuation of commercial relations by all of them, which was equivalent to tacit 
acquiescence to the implementation of the restriction in the entire system. Under the circumstances, 
the undertakings who became aware of the illicit initiative through the notice and who continued to 
be connected to the system must be held liable for participation in a concerted practice. 
 
2. Subsequent Conduct and the Causal Link 
In the Eturas case, the focus is clearly on concertation, and less on the subsequent conduct in the 
market and the causal link between concertation and conduct. This is understandable because it is 
                                                 
43  ECJ – Eturas, n. 26, 29, 34, 38, 39. 
44  ECJ – Eturas, n. 40. 
45  ECJ – Eturas, n. 50, first indent. 
46  ECJ – Eturas, n. 50, second indent. 
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obvious that the technical manipulation of the electronic booking system considerably reduces the 
room for manœuvre of the travel agencies in day-to-day practice. Even if they remain free to grant 
additional discounts, this requires supplementary technical steps. Hence, there is no doubt that 
concertation influenced subsequent behaviour because of the structure of E-TURAS. 
 
a) The Anic presumption 
Nevertheless, the case reveals an inherent difficulty of the Anic presumption. Indeed, it is now unclear 
whether the presumption refers solely to the causal link between concertation and subsequent 
behaviour, or whether it extends to the mere existence of subsequent behaviour itself. In its classical 
formulation, the former interpretation seems correct: it is presumed "that the undertakings 
participating in concerting arrangements and remaining active on the market take account of the 
information exchanged with their competitors when determining their conduct on that market".47 The 
ECJ reiterates this formulation in the Eturas judgement.48 However, the Advocate General goes one 
step further. He applies the presumption not only to the causal link but to the subsequent conduct by 
itself: The "actual conduct on the market may be presumed with regard to those undertakings who 
participate in collusive practices and who remain active on the market".49 
 
In our view, the following distinction should be made: when concertation is based on information 
exchange (as it was in the Anic case), it is not easy to determine the subsequent behaviour at all. There 
are simple cases where the information concerns future prices. If all participants of the information 
exchange conform their prices to the information given, it is feasible to determine that it was the cause 
of the subsequent behaviour. A ‘narrow Anic presumption’ which covers only the causal link, but not 
subsequent conduct itself, is then sufficient. If, however, the information exchange is more subtle, it 
is difficult to show the extent to which this exchange affects prices, quantities or other competitive 
behaviour. The principle of effectiveness then requires a ‘wide Anic presumption’ regarding 
subsequent conduct itself: the practical cooperation which has replaced the risks of competition may 
for example prevent the lowering of prices. 
 
Following this line of thought, a ‘narrow Anic presumption’ should apply in the Eturas case. It is not 
about the complex consequences of information exchange, but parties suffering an influence on an 
important price component. Indeed, discount rates are capped automatically by the system, without 
the agencies' input. The fact that individual discounts exceeding the cap remain possible does not 
                                                 
47  ECJ, 8.7.1999, C-49/92 P – Commission/Anic Partecipazioni, ECLI:EU:C:1999:356, n. 121. 
48  ECJ – Eturas, n. 33. 
49  AG Szpunar – Eturas, n. 41. 
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dispose of the price cartel. Hence, subsequent conduct can be proven. Consequently, the Anic 
presumption does not apply to subsequent conduct, but to the causal link between concertation and 
conduct. 
 
b) Rebuttal of the Presumption Based on Public Distancing 
As mentioned above, public distancing is a way of rebutting the Anic presumption. If firms which are 
part of a competition-restricting scheme do not clearly show that they disapprove of the unlawful 
behaviour of the other participants, they give out the impression that they subscribe to and comply 
with what has been agreed upon. They opt for a "passive mode of participation" encouraging the 
continuation of the illegal conduct and compromising its discovery.50 They then infringe Art. 101 
TFEU themselves. 
 
On the facts, the travel agencies did not in any way distance themselves from the system message. 
They could and should have manifested their disagreement, especially since they could not quit the 
system for lack of suitable alternative. While complete rupture of business relations with an otherwise 
legal distribution channel is not required for a distancing to be valid, there must be a timely, clear, 
public indication of withholding from the anti-competitive behaviour. Arguing that they did not know 
that the particular behaviour was illegal is not a defence. It was not enough for the agencies to 
continue offering independent personal discounts to clients to counterbalance the effects of the 
discount restriction on the E-TURAS system.51 In our view, the option accepted by the ECJ of sending 
an objection to the administrator is not sufficient for public distancing since such a communication 
stays in the sphere of the administrator. If the addressees of the system notice are not detectable (and 
high requirements should be applied to this finding), at least the own clients should be informed about 
the non-respect of the discount cap.52 
 
c) Rebuttal of the Presumption Based on Reporting to an Authority 
In addition to public distancing, the Court mentions reporting to an authority as a possibility of 
rebutting the presumption based on market conduct after the concertation. 53  In the context of 
Competition Law, the most common way for cartel participants to report to an authority is an 
application for leniency leading to a total or at least partial reduction of fines. In our context, a 
leniency application would have the following effect: because (timely) reporting to the authority 
                                                 
50  Cf. ECJ – Eturas, n. 28. 
51  AG Szpunar – Eturas, n. 90-93. 
52  This alternative has been mentioned by AG Szpunar – Eturas, n. 92. 
53  ECJ – Eturas, n. 46, 49 and 50, first indent; AG Szpunar – Eturas, n. 67, 84, 87, 92. This option is not a novelty 
of the Eturas judgment: Reporting to an authority has for example been mentioned in ECJ, 7.1.2004, C-204/00 P – 
Aalborg Portland and others/Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2004:6, n. 84. 
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allows the rebuttal of the presumption that the firm in question participated in concerted practices, 
that firm did not behave in an anti-competitive manner and there is no more accusation for which 
leniency could be claimed. For practical purposes, this raises the question whether the second 
leniency applicant (still participating in the collusion) now moves up to the first position leading to 
full immunity. In our view, there should not be any obstacle to this solution since the first leniency 
applicant is no longer part of the cartel so that its leniency application grasps at nothing. 
 
d) Rebuttal of the Presumption Based on an Independent Discount Policy 
Finally, the ECJ mentions a third possibility of rebutting the presumption reserved to forms of 
coordination other than anticompetitive meetings. The parties can show that they systematically acted 
in contradiction to the proposed or implemented anti-competitive practice. On the facts, this would 
mean that they applied higher discounts than provided for by the online booking system.54 In our 
view, however, a discount policy which is systematically independent from the automatic pre-setting 
of the online booking system does not fulfil the requirement of ‘subsequent conduct’ necessary for 
the existence of a concerted practice. If the manipulation of the computer system is not followed by 
corresponding behaviour of its users, then there is no room to apply a presumption of causal link, at 
least if the Anic presumption is restricted to the question of causation and does not extend to the 
subsequent conduct itself – as suggested here for cases outside information exchange. Hence, the 
systematic application of higher discounts already argues against the second element of the concerted 
practices test so that the question of causation does not arise. 
 
3. Restrictions by Object 
According to settled case law, it is not necessary to show the negative effects of an agreement if it 
has an anti-competitive object. 55  Horizontal price-fixing agreements are normally considered 
restrictions by object.56 This appreciation applies to the case at hand: it is the attempt to influence the 
free formation of prices by capping discount rates which "manifestly has as its object to restrict 
competition".57 Consequently, authorities and courts do not have to prove anti-competitive effects of 
that agreement.58 For example, it is irrelevant if travel agencies had granted higher discount rates 
                                                 
54  ECJ – Eturas, n. 46, 49 and 50, first indent. 
55  See the seminal judgments ECJ, 30.6.1966, 56/65 – Société Technique Minière / Maschinenbau Ulm, 
ECLI:EU:C:1966:38, p. 249; and ECJ, 13.7.1966, 56/64 – Consten and Grundig/Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1966:41, 
p. 342. 
56  ECJ, 11.9.2014, C-67/13 P – Groupement des cartes bancaires/Commission, E-CLI:EU:C:2014:2204, n. 51; 
exceptions exist in atypical situations, see ibid., n. 52 et seq. 
57  AG Szpunar – Eturas, n. 68. The Court did not deal with the distinction between restrictions by object and by 
effect. 
58  Restrictions by object are always appreciable, see ECJ, 13.12.2012, C-226/11 – Expedia, ECLI:EU:C:2012:795, 
n. 35-37. The thresholds of the De Minimis Notice therefore do not apply, see European Commission, Notice on 
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before the restriction was implemented, or if they sold any travel products via the E-TURAS system 
afterwards.59 The category of restrictions by object substantially lowers the evidentiary requirements. 
No proof of the negative effects of the behaviour in question in the markets is necessary. Legal orders 
which do not have a comparable allocation of the burden of proof have considerable difficulties in 
proving a violation of Competition Law if competition with respect to other competitive parameters 
still exists. 
 
However, the difference between restrictions by object and by effect is blurred in cases of concerted 
practices.60 As we have seen, the accusation of concerted practices is dropped if the undertaking in 
question can show that it systematically applied higher discounts than provided for by the 
computerised system. In this sense, the effect in the market plays a major role even in cases of 
horizontal price coordination which normally constitute a restriction by object for which no effects 
in the market have to be shown. In our view, the concept of concerted ‘practices’ indeed requires 
more openness to the effects of a certain behaviour. It is certainly true that also in the case of an 
‘agreement’, the restrictive object cannot be exclusively deduced from the contents of this agreement 
but has to be assessed against the whole economic and legal context of that agreement.61 However, 
despite the helpful presumptions, it is always necessary to prove a conduct subsequent to concertation 
in order to find concerted practices. Normally, cases involving concerted practices are therefore more 
fact-based than restrictions of competition by defined agreement. Nonetheless, the fundamental 
difference between restrictions by object and by effect should not be disregarded. Once a concerted 
practice has been found which "reveals in itself a sufficient degree of harm to competition"62 there is 
no need to examine its effects.63 Thus, the higher evidentiary requirements in cases of concerted 
practices only relate to the coordination between undertakings, but not to the relationship between 
coordination and the restriction of competition, which is subject to the object/effect distinction 
regardless of agreements or concerted practices. 
 
                                                 
agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, OJ 2014 C 291/1, n. 2, 13. However, the appreciability-test continues to apply when 
it comes to the question if trade between Member States may be affected, see European Commission, Guidelines on the 
effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ 2004 C 101/81. 
59  AG Szpunar – Eturas, n. 70. 
60  See e.g. Schröter/Voet van Vormizeele, in: Schröter/Jakob/Klotz/Mederer (eds.), Europäisches 
Wettbewerbsrecht, 2nd ed., Baden-Baden 2014, Art. 101 AEUV, n. 62; Whish/Bailey, Competition Law, 8th edition, 
Oxford 2015, p. 119. 
61  ECJ, 11.9.2014, C-67/13 P – Groupement des cartes bancaires/Commission, E-CLI:EU:C:2014:2204, n. 53. 
62  See the definition of "restriction by object" in ECJ, 11.9.2014, C-67/13 P – Groupement des cartes 
bancaires/Commission, E-CLI:EU:C:2014:2204, n. 57. 
63  Emmerich, in: Immenga/Mestmäcker (eds), Wettbewerbsrecht Band 1.EU/Teil 1, 5th ed., Munich 2012, Art. 101 
Abs. 1 AEUV, n. 95. 
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4. Cartel Facilitators 
A special characteristic of the case is that Eturas, the right-holder of the E-TURAS booking system 
is not active on the market of the travel agencies which use this system. The Lithuanian Competition 
Council nevertheless concluded that Eturas had infringed Art. 101(1) TFEU since it had played a role 
in facilitating the discount coordination. The national court does not submit a preliminary question 
concerning liability of cartel facilitators. Consequently, the Advocate General only mentions this 
problem and proceeds to some distinctions regarding existing case law.64 The ECJ does not take a 
stance either,65 though it is clear from recent case law that the Court affirms the liability of cartel 
facilitators. In the AC Treuhand case, it has argued that Art. 101(1) TFEU covers all agreements and 
concerted practices restricting competition "irrespective of the market on which the parties operate, 
and that only the commercial conduct of one of the parties need be affected by the terms of the 
arrangements in question".66 In order to guarantee the ‘full effectiveness’ of Art. 101(1) TFEU,67 a 
firm which provides services aiming at the attainment of the anti-competitive objects of its contractual 
partners is also guilty of violating the cartel prohibition.68 
 
Nonetheless, these recent developments are not even pertinent in the Eturas case. Eturas is not a 
consultancy firm like AC Treuhand, but is active on a market which is upstream to the cartel market.69 
The online booking system is used by travel agencies to sell travel bookings on their websites and 
apparently allows to take influence on the amount of rebates. Therefore, the judgment is convincing 
insofar as it includes Eturas into the circle of cartel perpetrators. 
 
5. The Role of Presumptions in Competition Law 
The Eturas judgement is a milestone for the question of proof and evidence in Competition Law. In 
the field of public enforcement (be it under administrative or criminal law70), it is the task of the 
authorities to investigate the facts and to adduce evidence. Moreover, the presumption of innocence 
requires that everyone who has been charged "shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty 
                                                 
64  AG Szpunar – Eturas, n. 42. 
65  See ECJ – Eturas, n. 15-16, where the decision of the Lithuanian Competition Council is reported without further 
analysis. 
66  ECJ, 22.10.2015, C-194/14 P – AC Treuhand/Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2015:717, n. 35. 
67  ECJ – AC Treuhand, n. 36. 
68  ECJ – AC Treuhand, n. 37-39. 
69  See the distinguishing by AG Szpunar – Eturas, n. 42. In the AC Treuhand case, Advocate General Wahl rejected 
the liability of mere service providers (contrary to the later Court decision), but reserved this finding to companies not 
trading on the relevant market (for the cartel) or on related markets, see the Opinion of Advocate General Wahl in AC 
Treuhand/Commission (C-194/14 P, ECLI:EU:C:2015:350), for example n. 61 et seq. and the preceding headline. In the 
Eturas case, this narrow interpretation would not change the legal assessment since Eturas is not a mere service provider 
helping to implement a cartel, but the firm is active on an upstream market. 
70  For the qualification of Competition Law fines and the consequences under Art. 6 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights see ECtHR, Case no. 43509/08 of 27 September 2011 – Menarini Diagnostics. 
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according to law" (Art. 48(1) Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Art. 6(2) 
European Convention on Human Rights). On the other hand, public procedures serve a general 
interest and have to be effective. It is therefore recognised that presumptions can be used not only in 
administrative but also in criminal law if they respect certain conditions. The European Court of 
Human Rights has clarified that the presumption of innocence "requires States to confine them [scil. 
presumptions] within reasonable limits which take into account the importance of what is at stake 
and maintain the rights of the defence".71 
 
In the Eturas judgment, the ECJ follows this path. It deduces from the presumption of innocence that 
awareness of the system notice cannot be inferred from the mere dispatch of the message. However, 
a presumption of awareness may be based on "other objective and consistent indicia".72 In this 
context, the Court develops a balanced approach exploring the middle ground between the 
presumption of innocence and the effectiveness of the application of Competition Law on the one 
hand, and between the EU competence for basic rules of evidence and the national competence for 
the assessment of evidence on the other. The result is a complicated mechanism which does not 
always make clear the extension of the procedural autonomy of the EU Member States. The 
guidelines are even more complex as the case is about concerted practices which require an even 
more careful analysis than ‘simple’ or 'straightforward' agreements. 
 
What is made perfectly clear, however, is that the principle of effectiveness requires rules on proof 
and evidence which "must not render the implementation of EU competition rules impossible or 
excessively difficult".73 Therefore, not only direct evidence, but also indicia have to be admitted if 
they are objective and consistent. In this context, it is possible to establish presumptions provided that 
the firms have the possibility to rebut them. For this purpose, no "excessive or unrealistic steps" must 
be required.74 In our view, these principles should be interpreted in the following sense: the rebuttal 
of presumptions used by competition authorities and courts should not require full proof of the 
contrary.75 Presumptions in this context should be regarded as prima facie or res ipsa loquitur 
evidence where the rebuttal simply requires the creation of serious and reasonable doubts.76 
 
                                                 
71  ECtHR, Case no. 10519/83 of 7 October 1988 – Salabiaku v. France, n. 28. 
72  ECJ – Eturas, n. 39-40. 
73  ECJ – Eturas, n. 35. 
74  ECJ – Eturas, n. 41. 
75  AG Szpunar – Eturas, n. 99. 
76  For more details see Andreas Heinemann, Access to Evidence and Presumptions – Communicating Vessels in 
Procedural Law, in: Hüschelrath/Schweitzer (eds.), Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law in Europe – 
Legal and Economic Perspectives, Berlin, Heidelberg 2014, p. 167, 177 et seq. 
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IV. The Role of Computer Systems in Competition Law 
 
The Eturas judgment marks the mere beginning of Competition Law analysis with respect to 
computer-based cooperation strategies. At the heart of the case there is a system notice informing the 
users of an online booking system about the restriction of discounts accompanied by a technical 
restriction on discount rate entry into the system. Although such a system notice may not be a "usual 
channel for commercial communication" and less intense than e-mail contact,77 it may be a sufficient 
basis for concerted practices aiming at a restriction of competition. It all depends on the ‘awareness’ 
of the firms connected to the booking system with respect to the discount cap. The ECJ clearly states 
that without such awareness the "participation in a concertation cannot be inferred from the mere 
existence of a technical restriction implemented in the system […], unless it is established on the 
basis of other objective and consistent indicia that it tacitly assented to an anticompetitive action."78 
 
Thus, the essence of the judgment seems to be that technology alone cannot violate the cartel 
prohibition, and that assent of the respective firm is required. This leads to the more fundamental 
question of how Competition Law analysis should proceed if the practical functioning of a computer 
algorithm has become so autonomous that interference of firms and their employees is no longer 
necessary in order to influence prices of competing (or vertically related) firms. Should Competition 
Law liability in a machine-controlled environment still depend on ‘awareness’ or should other, more 
adapted criteria be developed? 
 
In defence of the ‘awareness’ prerequisite, one could point to the fact that at least at the time of 
implementation of the computer system in question, an anti-competitive ‘meeting of the minds’ must 
have occurred, which may be attributed to the whole life-span of the system, even if the participating 
firms were not directly involved in the maintenance and the updating of that system. Yet how can 
initial awareness be proven if no information is available other than the connection of the firm in 
question to the computer system? In our view, the integration of a firm into a computer system which 
fixes prices (no matter if it concerns gross price, discounts, other deductions, surcharges, net prices 
etc.) with competitors (or which practices illegal vertical price maintenance79) is sufficient in order 
                                                 
77  This is at least the opinion of AG Szpunar – Eturas, n. 60. 
78  ECJ – Eturas, n. 45. 
79  See the Swiss case "Hors-Liste": The Swiss Competition Commission had found vertical price fixing based on 
the automatical (although alterable) transfer of price recommendations from wholesalers to retailers by means of a 
database (Decision of 2 November 2009, Recht und Politik des Wettbewerbs 2010/4, 649). The decision is not yet final. 
The Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland affirmed the applicability of the Swiss Competition Act (Decision of 28 
January 2015, BGE 141 II 66) and remanded the case to the Swiss Federal Administrative Court which will have to decide 
on substance now. 
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to establish a restrictive agreement or concerted practice. If pricing is completely delegated to 
software (without any need of administrator notices) with the object or effect of harmonising prices 
between competitors (or to impose vertical price fixing), the ‘Cartel of the Machines’ amounts to a 
cartel between undertakings. In these cases, traditional meetings or forms of communication are 
replaced by an algorithm which renders direct concertation superfluous. This result is not influenced 
by the fact that prices can still be modified by human intervention. If such interference does not take 
place, the goal of setting aside competitive pressure is achieved. Therefore, the delegation of 
competitors' pricing decisions to a unified computer system should constitute indirect evidence 
leading to a (rebuttable) presumption of a concerted practice. 
 
The significance of computer systems in Competition Law analysis will certainly increase 
considerably over time.80 As is usually the case with technological developments, Competition Law 
has to adapt to the new environment.81 The consequences are frequently unclear and contested, and 
there will be grey areas.82 In the context of the formation of cartels, however, the situation is less 
complicated. Here, only the medium of concertation changes. Instead of meetings, phone calls or e-
mail exchanges, a computer system can be programmed in order to fix prices or at least – as in the 
case at hand – to cap discounts. For Competition Law to remain effective, it is important to cover 
new forms of coordination. Otherwise, the independence of economic actors would be jeopardised 
by the sophisticated tools made available by the new technologies. 
                                                 
80  The first assessments of the future of Competition Law in the context of autonomous computer systems have 
been submitted. See Ariel Ezrachi/Maurice E. Stucke, Artificial Intelligence & Collusion: When Computers Inhibit 
Competition, The University of Oxford Centre for Competition Law and Policy Working Paper CCLP (L) 40 (with 
references to relevant US case law); Salil Mehra, Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time of Algorithms, 
Minnesota Law Review (forthcoming). 
81  For the digital world see Rupprecht Podszun, The More Technological Approach: Competition Law in the 
Digital Economy, in Surblyte (ed.), Competition on the Internet, Berlin/Heidelberg 2015, p. 101 et seq. 
82  See the example of Ezrachi/Stucke (supra note 80, at II D) of autonomous machines which are programmed on 
optimizing profitability but which may (but do not necessarily) lead to collusion. 
